November 29, 2006
The Full Costs of the Iraq Fiasco
In addition to more obvious damage, the administration’s
Iraq debacle has had a significant impact on many aspects of
our country’s security. As the dust clears, the full cost
will become more evident and painful. Redirection efforts
must take into account these larger systemic impacts to
begin to get our great country back on a more secure track.
The war effort itself is unraveling geometrically. While
Washington insiders debate the fine points, the country is
falling apart, with our soldiers in the middle and no
feasible end in sight. There are rumors that even Barney,
the White House dog, has been growling at any mention of
Iraq on television. If Barney is on the case, can the
President be far behind?
Bringing our brave troops home, whether sooner or later,
will not end our Iraq nightmare, but only begin a new
chapter. The administration made one accurate prediction:
that our exit will leave behind a catastrophe, for the
Iraqis and ourselves, as a consequence of this obsessive and
poorly planned crusade.
Al Qaeda recruitment is believed to be up considerably, as
our own military recruitment flounders. These situations are
likely to continue for some time. We have severely weakened
our ties with Muslim governments, some that depend on our
support, in countries where the only alternative is extreme
Islamic groups. We need to mend these fences, and at an
acceptable cost.
Our depleted political capital limits possibilities to play
positive roles in other situations – Darfur being an obvious
example. The Arab government of Sudan is committing
atrocities on Black Africans (Muslims themselves) of
Saddamesque proportions, but we can’t afford to do anything
that might look like further “persecution” of Arabs.
Likewise we have lost the legitimacy to press for reforms in
several hated Arab dictatorships in the region.
The U.S. forced Pakistan to break a centuries-old
understanding with the people of its tribal areas and send
in Pakistani troops. This action may have weakened the
Pakistani government even more than its more general support
of U.S. policy in the region. Pakistan and other countries
are forced by the “with us or against us” approach of the
U.S. government to take explicit positions on subtle issues,
positions which weaken them internally.
We have lost the moral high ground for the advocacy of
principles in the conduct of war, as a result of our own
atrocities and the administration’s fuzziness regarding
prohibitions on torture. We claim exceptions for people
attacking us, the very situations that tempt those
prohibited behaviors for any country. Our putting ourselves
in a special category of the “righteous”, above normal
ethical restrictions, will create a lack of trust for years,
unless it is somehow addressed.
Our go-it-alone “cowboy” approach has alienated us from
traditional allies of many years. “Old Europe” as they may
be, these alliances, developed through the sacrifices of our
troops in WWII, the Marshall Plan and 50 years of nurturing,
have been severely weakened in the name of the
administration’s Iraq obsession. They will take some very
wise attention to restore.
Internally, it is clear that we have weakened our military
substantially, and made it difficult for ourselves to be a
credible deterrent in other situations that threaten us more
than Saddam’s Iraq: Iran and North Korea most especially.
Our military leadership questioning our current capacity to
add Marines in Iraq sends an unfortunate message to other
potential adversaries.
There will be effects on the trust of our current and
potential military in the government they are serving –
regarding the cause for which they risk their lives, the
strategy for doing it and agreements that government makes
with them about their service. It took us 40 years to
recover from the effects of Vietnam on our national psyche.
Who knows the ultimate cost of the “Iraq complex”?
The total impact is leaving our country and the world weaker
and less stable. King Abdullah recently pointed out three
civil wars now brewing in the Middle East, the region the
Iraq adventure was supposed to stabilize: in Iraq, the
Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. New leadership must
address all these issues, beginning now, and especially when
a new president assumes office in two years. This will take
a genuinely strategic approach: for re-establishing
relationships, confronting our adversaries with the active
support of many more countries, re-strengthening our
military and security at home and re-establishing norms of
respectful dialogue – a strategic approach that has been
missing for the last six years.
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