April 16, 2007

Might We Learn from the Brits and ‘Get to Yes’?

 

Recent tensions between Iran and Great Britain regarding Britain’s captured sailors brought to mind a similar episode in 1968, involving the U.S.S. Pueblo’s capture by the North Koreans. They accused the ship and crew of spying in its territorial waters.

 

Roger Fisher, Harvard negotiations expert and co-author of “Getting to Yes”, about win/win negotiation, used the ensuing crisis for demonstrating basic negotiation principles in an early book, “International Conflict for Beginners”.

 

The relevant chapter, “Improve What Happens to Them if They Are Good”, analyzes the U.S. demand: “Return the ship and crew immediately without preconditions - or else!” from the perspective of the North Koreans. It lists the advantage of accepting the U.S. demand – avoiding military reprisal – and disadvantages – admitting the seizure was wrong, yielding to U.S. blackmail, looking incompetent and accepting the legitimacy of spy boats.

 

It then lists some advantages of refusing the U.S. demand – showing the U.S. to be powerless, diverting U.S. attention from Vietnam (remember?), directing attention to U.S. spying, keeping the possibility of returning the ship and crew later – and disadvantage – some risk of military reprisal. The analysis demonstrates the North Koreans could not rationally accede to the U.S. demand. (The lists are summarized from the book.)

 

The analysis describes an alternative U.S. proposal – asking that the crew be returned without prejudice to North Korea’s position, and that the disposition of the ship await a settlement of the dispute, removing any threat of immediate attack, but suggesting long-term South Korean military build up if the dispute continued. It similarly demonstrates this proposal’s increased appeal to North Korea and its consistency with U.S. interests.

 

The proposal ultimately played out much as described. The recent visit of New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson et al to the Pueblo in North Korea reminded us of that crisis and its ultimate disposition.

 

The British seemed to utilize these principles in handling their recent Iranian crisis. They must have made the Iranians what Fisher calls “a yessable proposition”. We don’t know the exact terms – perhaps a British promise of no retribution and pledge to avoid Iranian territorial waters in the future, whatever the truth was this time around. In any case it was good enough to get the fortunate Brits homebound and everyone looking pretty good. Perhaps these principles might provide guidance for U.S. conflicts with Iran regarding nuclear weapons and other matters.

 

The U.S. government and others have insisted that Iran cease its nuclear program, despite assertions about its only peaceful purposes. The calculus of Iran’s government for accepting might include advantages: like looking cooperative to the world and moderate Iranians, avoiding further sanctions and possible military strikes; and disadvantages: looking weak, surrendering bargaining leverage, abandoning nuclear power for the present, and any possibility of nuclear weapons and opening the door to further pressure.

 

Might a different proposal be more acceptable to Iran, while still responding to the core interests of the U.S.? The exact wording will be left to technical experts, but one imagines, for example, one that permits the development of some level of peaceful nuclear capacity with agreed-upon verification.

 

This approach would bring Iranians advantages – like validating and supporting Iranians’ “legitimate” right to nuclear status, providing a moral victory, standing up to yet another super-power and improving its stature with many constituencies; and disadvantages – eliminating the possibility of nuclear weapons, at least for the present, and making Iran look weaker to radical constituencies. All in all not a bad outcome.

 

How might this deal seem to the U.S.? It would provide reasonable assurance (with verification) that Iran will not build nuclear weapons, at least for now, avoid a more serious confrontation, make the U.S. look cooperative, gain greater support for any future Iranian transgressions, strengthen moderates within Iran and validate the principle that nuclear weapons expansion be limited.

 

However, this approach also allows Iran to develop its general nuclear capacity (which they will probably do anyway), provides them a limited moral victory and perhaps makes the U.S. look weaker to some constituencies. A deal? Perhaps.

 

Of course this practical approach challenges the notion that evil countries should do what we want simply because we believe they are evil, oh yes, and we are powerful enough to make them, and we can do whatever we want because we are good. This has been the basic axiom behind U.S. foreign policy for six-plus years. By most standards it qualifies as magical thinking and must be changed. This approach might help. Thanks, Roger.

 

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