April 9,
2007
Is the Iraq
End Game Here at Last?
We may not
yet be in the “last throes of the insurgency”. But hopefully
one way or the other, we will soon be in the last throes of
one of the most disastrous foreign blunders in our history.
Increasing
numbers, including many Republicans, are abandoning the
president’s lemming-like march. Even the conservative
Heritage Foundation recently made fun (as much fun as those
guys make) of the president’s tagline about the terrorists
following us home, pointing out that most of them are local,
and that the relatively few Al Qaeda fighters have neither
the means nor desire to come here. Even Henry Kissinger, the
president’s now less-frequent visitor and confidant,
believes there is no prospect of anything looking like
victory in this war.
The
president’s people are still waiting to be met as liberators
and show no sign of changing their positions or plans, the
meddlesome Congress or new developments notwithstanding. If
he can stick it out for another 20 months, he may just leave
this mess for the next president, a vision that he let slip
out with unusual candor several months ago. Still, if cooler
and wiser heads prevail, we may yet reverse course, perhaps
even without a major constitutional crisis.
As the
Democrats struggle with crafting a practical exit strategy,
the vice president accuses them of creating moving targets.
Huh? The administration’s own expressed goals have varied a
bit – from a showcase of Middle East democracy, to a
multi-ethnic constitutional government, to any government
that can survive for a while on its own, or perhaps oil
sellers friendlier than Hugo Chavez and now exit with even a
Vietnam-like fig leaf of respect. Those fickle Democrats –
there they go again.
So what if
we had a critical mass of clear-headed leaders willing to
plan a least-bad way for minimizing everyone’s losses? What
then?
The
principal criteria appear to be 1) lessening as possible the
fallout from the war; 2) catalyzing Iraq’s establishing
equilibrium and stability after our departure; and 3)
encouraging an Iraqi government whose actions are as
consistent as possible with American interests – even given
that according to polls a majority of Iraqis want us out,
many even feeling it’s appropriate to attack American
troops. Still, not all versions will be created equal
regarding concrete American interests.
Three
useful areas of focus are:
Reframe the
Domestic Debate –
The main
question is not Iraq, win or lose, as the administration
insists, but rather, “Is our continued outpouring of blood
and treasure on a lost and increasingly costly cause our
best strategy for fighting a long-term global battle with
Islamic militants?” Iraq is still not the cornerstone of
this global war, unless we continue to make it so – at the
expense of Afghanistan, Pakistan, border security, cargo
inspections, international policing, relations with Muslim
countries, etc., etc.
Plan Our
Withdrawal
– We will leave Iraq at some point and a large mess behind
whenever we do. That is the conclusion of most analysts,
including long-time administration supporters. U.S. forces
have become a bandage - temporarily covering many future
costs of this tragic intervention. They will become fully
evident in any case.
The
Democrats putting all their eggs in the basket of a specific
and public date for withdrawal may not be the answer. There
is some concern about giving our adversaries this useful
information, though a clear timeline should be a part of the
plan – leaving aside the question of with whom and when we
share this information.
How our
military leaves Iraq will be as important as when. Our
withdrawal must be safe and orderly – with no hasty
helicopter escapes from embassy roofs. Clarity that we are
acting strategically will cause less risk of miscalculation
by adversaries or friends regarding our resolve about the
larger conflict.
Involve
Regional Players –
Despite the
anger in the region towards us, there is a shared interest
in minimizing fallout from this disaster. Involvement of
others in decisions gives them part ownership of the
resulting cost. This was the case in the first Gulf War.
Unfortunately it has not yet been the case for this one.
There is
still something to be gained from involvement of key
players, even real and potential adversaries, in planning
now. They will most experience the impact and possess
similar concerns and perhaps desires. We’ll have to listen
to some unpleasant comments, but that will be a small price
to pay for lessening the catastrophic fallout.
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