January 29, 2007
A Small Glimmer of Hope in the Middle East?
I’m glad to hear that our Secretary of State is working to
restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and focusing
directly on the end-point of negotiations. I have long
believed that this “final status” approach represents the
one potential strategy for an agreement. The only possible
incentives for overcoming the deep-seated resistance on all
sides are Palestinians’ longing for a real country of their
own and Israelis’ thirst for genuine long-term peace.
This approach contradicts usual resolution practice of
building a relationship incrementally, with successes on
small, even procedural issues, gradually developing trust
for taking on more difficult challenges. Here, however, many
of those “smaller” issues, have the potential for derailing
the entire conversation. Disagreements about the starting
point of relevant history, cease-fire rules, names of groups
at the table or many others could become a breakdown about
everything. What just might hold them together is the need
to change the status quo and an interdependent long-range
vision.
For some time observers have expressed similar ideas about
an eventual agreement: Israeli military and political
withdrawal from most of the land occupied in the Six-Day War
with some mutually accepted adjustments, Israeli recognition
and support for an independent Palestinian state on this
land with security guarantees for both sides, Palestinian
and broader Arab recognition of Israel, including an end to
the state of war and help with resistance, compensation for
lands lost by both sides (from 1948 on), and arrangements
for Jerusalem that provide appropriate control over
religious sites and security.
The critical questions are: 1) Can enough Israelis accept
the notion that their “manifest destiny” stopped some years
ago, with all the implications for current settlements, in
return for a lasting peace? 2) Can a critical mass of
Palestinians and other Arabs accept the legitimacy of
Israel, sell it to their own constituencies and survive to
enjoy the benefits, in return for no further Israeli
expansion and fair treatment of their people, somehow
defined? By “critical mass” I mean a combination of leaders
and groups with the power to make and enforce an agreement
that could survive the next coup or election. 3) Will
critical stakeholders accept the plan? Some accounts of the
negotiation between Arafat, Barak and President Clinton
attribute the ultimate failure to Arafat’s fear of reprisal
from Muslims outside the area for concessions on Jerusalem.
History suggests these elements are not assured. A critical
mass of Palestinians and Arabs have not yet existed, for
whatever religious, personal and political factors, that
could and would accept the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish
country. Likewise, there has not been a clear Israeli
political constituency for making and selling the
concessions necessary to make the deal. Thanks to the other
side, neither has really been pressured to work this out.
Israelis and Palestinians have to convince each other they
will support the other’s main need. Each side now suspects
the other will never do their part – with some reason. I
have not yet heard a major political leader on either side
put forth a vision that includes this full scenario.
Israelis use the Palestinians’ ambiguity to not address
their own issues. No Israeli political leader wants to go
down in Jewish history as the one who lost Judea and
Samaria, otherwise known as the West Bank, or for the
concessions that put the country at risk – a plausible
possibility in the age of Iranian nuclear power, Hezbollah,
Hamas and the rest.
Palestinian leaders often include loophole phrases in
relevant statements. Yasser Arafat’s favorite was “respect
for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians”. The
translation for many, Israelis and Palestinians –
repatriation of Palestinians to post-1947 Israel, in other
words, the end of Israel as a special homeland for the
Jewish people – a non-starter for any deal.
The “final status” approach will test these critical
questions by addressing them directly. Both sides need to
“taste” the real possibility of their most valued desire,
and work through some difficult issues of their own. They
will need help to do their part. To know each side has
provided the best reasons for the other not to face their
own issues. It’s both or nothing.
This great achievement will require bold, unequivocal
statements by key leadership that their groups are open to
the other’s cherished goals, with their own. This will take
some work, by Ms. Rice and others, and Sadat-like boldness
on the part of leaders themselves, Palestinians, Israelis
and those of other key countries. It’s that or many years
more of the same.
To offer
feedback on this column,
click here.
