Jamie Weinstein

As President Barack Obama continues to deliberate over whether or not to fulfill General Stanley McChrystal’s request for more troops in Afghanistan, one of the president’s greatest concerns is reportedly the unreliability and questionable legitimacy of the current Afghan government.

Trust the man.

While this is hardly a trivial concern, it should be remembered that this same concern weighed heavily on those contemplating what turned out to be the hugely successful Iraq surge former President George W. Bush decided to implement in January 2007.

It will likely surprise many that commentator Charles Krauthammer, of all people, best articulated this concern while weighing in against the Iraq surge in his influential Washington Post column.

“If we were allied with an Iraqi government that, however weak, was truly national — cross-confessional and dedicated to fighting a two-front war against Baathist insurgents and Shiite militias — a surge of American troops, together with a change of counterinsurgency strategy, would have a good chance of succeeding,” Krauthammer wrote in January 2007. “Unfortunately, the Iraqi political process has given us Nouri al-Maliki and his Shiite coalition.”

Calling Maliki’s government “hopelessly sectarian,” Krauthammer concluded, “If it were my choice, I would not ‘surge’ American troops in defense of such a government. I would not trust it to deliver on its promises.” And despite his confidence in General David Petraeus, Krauthammer lamented that he was “afraid the effort will fail…because the Maliki government will undermine it.”

Krauthammer’s hesitancy back in 2007 about the proposed Iraq surge was eminently reasonable. His concerns were shared by others, including many in the military establishment. Thankfully, it was a rare instance in which Krauthammer was wrong. The Iraq surge worked. Defying many in the Pentagon, President Bush made the risky decision to surge American troops in Iraq, along with an accompanying change in strategy, in an effort to give America a chance for success. While it remains to be seen whether Iraq will ultimately turn out to be a stable country, President Bush’s decision helped defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq, undeniably reversed a losing situation and gave the United States the opportunity for success we have today.

In many ways, Krauthammer’s concern in 2007 with regard to the Iraq surge is Obama’s concern in 2009 with regard to the potential Afghan surge.

Last month, Afghanistan held national elections that were widely viewed as corrupt. After the United States persuaded Afghan President Hamid Karzai to participate in a run-off election against his leading challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, Mr. Abdullah withdrew, citing concern that the forthcoming elections wouldn’t be any cleaner.

Critics have warned that, without a reliable ally in the Afghan government, America’s mission in the backward country is doomed to failure and therefore it is best for the United States to drawback. As conservative columnist George Will wrote last week, “If (Obama) is looking for a strategy that depends on legitimacy in Kabul, he is looking for a unicorn.”

The concern over the reliability of the Afghan government is not lost on General McChrystal. In his August report to the president, General McChrystal expressed acute awareness of the failures of the Afghan government. Nonetheless, he concluded that America could still work with it and that success was possible in Afghanistan—but only if the mission was properly resourced.

Mission success in Afghanistan is a vital American national security interest. If America were to abandon or fail in the Afghan mission, a resurgent Taliban could very well retake the country with the only difference being that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are reportedly now much more interwoven than ever before.

With a safe haven in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda would be free to regroup and train. The result would be an increased terror threat to America. While some opponents of the Afghan surge try to minimize the importance of Afghanistan to al-Qaeda, terrorism expert Peter Bergen correctly noted in a recent article in The New Republic that “nearly every major jihadist plot against Western targets in the last two decades somehow leads back to Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

Looming in the background is also the fear that failure in Afghanistan would create further instability in Pakistan. If, God forbid, Pakistan were to fall to Islamists, there is the frightening prospect of Jihadists finally getting hold of a nuclear arsenal.

“If we are good here (Afghanistan), it will have a good effect on Pakistan,” McChrystal told The New York Times, explaining how success in Afghanistan is also important to fostering stability in Pakistan. “But if we fail here, Pakistan will not be able to solve their problems—it would be like burning leaves on a windy day next door.”

The Iraqi and Afghan situations are not exact parallels, but lessons learned in Iraq can certainly be applied to Afghanistan. One of those lessons is that, despite concerns over the Iraqi government’s ability to do its job to complement the U.S. military’s surge of troops and change in strategy, the ultimate result was successful in reversing a losing situation (at least so far).

If General McChrystal believes that he can achieve a similar result with the current Afghan governmental situation, President Obama ought to trust him. After all, it was President Obama who appointed General McChrystal in May, and it was President Obama who set the mission General McChrystal is now asking for more troops to fulfill.

America and the free world simply cannot allow Afghanistan to once again become a safe haven for al-Qaeda to use as an open base to plot against the West. Let us hope the CBS report suggesting President Obama has decided to fully back his general with a surge of troops is accurate. And let us also hope that the president gives orders to implement the good general’s strategy without delay.

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